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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the dynamics of the personal-bankruptcy rate over the business 
cycle by exploiting large cross-state variation.  We find that bankruptcy rates are 
significantly above trend during a recession and rise as a recession persists.  After a 
recession ends, there is a hangover whereby bankruptcy rates begin to fall but remain 
above trend for several more quarters.  Recovery periods see a strong bounce-back effect 
with bankruptcy rates significantly below trend for several quarters.  Despite the 
significant increases in bankruptcies during recessions, the largest contributor to rising 
bankruptcies during these periods has tended to be the longstanding upward trend. 
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1. Introduction 
 It is surprising, perhaps, that there is little consensus regarding the importance of 
adverse events such as job loss for households’ personal-bankruptcy decisions.  Studies 
using individual-level data, for example, often find that the bankruptcy decision is 
unrelated to increases in local unemployment rates or decreases in average income (Fay 
et al., 2002; White, 2009; Fisher, 2005).  These studies instead find support for 
bankruptcy as a strategic choice, whereby households react to the financial benefits of 
bankruptcy rather than a nonstrategic outcome driven by a reduced ability to repay debts.  
In contrast with these empirical results, numerous surveys of bankruptcy filers suggest 
that the underlying cause of most bankruptcies is an unexpected negative shock to 
household income, such as a job loss (Stavins, 2000; Warren, 2003).  Even so, survey 
results are inconsistent:  Whereas Sullivan et al. (2000) attribute two-thirds of personal 
bankruptcies to job loss, Himmelstein et al. (2005) find that more than half are the result 
of the lack of medical insurance following a serious injury or illness. 
 At the national level, data present an inconsistent picture of the link between 
economic conditions and personal bankruptcy, even during recessions, when job losses 
are especially prevalent.  Theoretical models such as Rampini (2005) suggest that 
personal bankruptcies are countercyclical, but during two of the five NBER recessions 
experienced in the United States between 1980 and 2009—1982-83 and 2001—the 
national bankruptcy rate actually fell (Figure 1).  In addition, recovery periods have been 
accompanied sometimes by higher rates of bankruptcy than were experienced during the 
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recessions that preceded them.  And even for those recessions during which the 
bankruptcy rate rose, it is not clear that this was anything more than ongoing trends.  
 The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the link between economic 
conditions and personal bankruptcy.  Our approach is based on the notion that it is not the 
weakness of economic activity that matters, but the persistence of the weakness.  To 
capture the persistence of weak labor markets, we estimate a personal-bankruptcy cycle 
with three phases—trend, recession, and recovery—that align with the business cycle.  
Also, rather than using official recession dates from the NBER, which are linked most 
closely with national GDP growth, we use state-level recession dates that are based on 
labor-market conditions.  State-level data give us a better geographic match between 
economic conditions and bankruptcy decisions, while labor-market recessions provide us 
a better match between households and the conditions that matter for them.    
 We find a personal-bankruptcy cycle for which the rate of personal bankruptcy 
rises above its trend rate throughout the length of a recession.  After the recession ends, 
there is a hangover whereby bankruptcy rates begin to fall but remain above trend for 
several more quarters.  Recovery periods see a strong bounce-back effect with 
bankruptcy rates significantly below trend for several quarters before returning to trend.  
The more severe the preceding recession, the deeper is this bounce-back.    
 The paper proceeds as follows:  In Section 2 we review briefly the personal-
bankruptcy literature, which has focused on explaining the upward trends in bankruptcies 
illustrated by Figure 1.  Section 3 describes and presents the results of our estimation of 
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state-level labor-market recessions.  We describe the cross-state differences in the levels 
and trends in bankruptcy rates and outline our empirical approach in Section 4.  Our 
baseline estimate of the movement of bankruptcy rates during and after recessions is 
presented in Section 5.  Our baseline results are put into aggregate perspective in Section 
6, and restricted versions of the baseline model are discussed in Section 7.  Section 8 
concludes. 
2. The Personal-Bankruptcy Literature 
 The literature on U.S. personal bankruptcy has focused on the dramatic rise in 
bankruptcy filings that occurred between 1985 and 2004.  As illustrated by Figure 1, the 
national bankruptcy rate increased from roughly 0.3 per 1,000 people in the first quarter 
of 1985 to 1.2 per 1,000 people in the fourth quarter of 2004.
1
  National and state filing 
rates declined sharply after the implementation in 2005 of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, which made it more difficult for consumers to 
file for bankruptcy (liquidation under Chapter 7).  The new rules meant an upward spike 
in the national bankruptcy rate to 2.2 per 1,000 people in the fourth quarter of 2005, 
before the new rules were in place, followed by a huge downward spike to 0.4 per 1,000 
people in the first quarter of 2006 under the new rules.  Even under the new rules the 
                                                 
1
 This represents the sum of personal-bankruptcy filings under Chapters 7, 11, and 13.  All bankruptcy data 
are from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and are available at 
www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts.html. 
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personal-bankruptcy rate has steadily increased, hitting 1.2 per 1,000 people by the 
second quarter of 2009, after a year and a half of recession.
2
 
 Numerous explanations for this rise have been offered and estimated empirically: 
the increased use of credit cards and increased consumer debt (Durkin, 2000; White, 
2007), the spread of casino gambling (Barron et al., 2002; Thalheimer and Ali, 2004; 
Garrett and Nichols, 2008), a reduced social stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy 
(Garrett, 2007), changes to state and federal bankruptcy laws (Nelson, 1999), and greater 
access to secured and unsecured credit (Gropp et al., 1997).
3
  Most recently, Livshits et 
al. (2010) model and compare the various explanations and conclude that ―a decrease in 
the transactions cost of lending and in the cost of bankruptcy‖ account for the rise in 
personal bankruptcy.    
3. State Labor-Market Recessions 
Our first step is to determine appropriate dates for recessions at the state level.  As 
is well known for the country as a whole, the close link between the NBER recession 
dates and employment growth broke down with the 1990-91 recession when the end of 
the recession was followed by a lengthy period during which aggregate employment 
continued to fall.  One reason that there has not been a consistent relationship between 
personal-bankruptcy rates and recessions is that NBER recession dates tend to be aligned 
                                                 
2
 See Morgan et al. (2009) for a discussion of the effects of the change in bankruptcy laws on foreclosures 
and the onset of recession in 2008. 
3
 See also Domowitz and Sartain (1999), who find that medical expenses and credit card debt are the 
strongest contributors to personal bankruptcy.  These studies are a small sample of the much broader 
literature.  Further research on the subject can be obtained by consulting the references in the cited studies. 
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with GDP growth rather than labor markets, which are more relevant for personal 
bankruptcy.  It is not appropriate, therefore, to use NBER recession dates because the 
effects of a recession on labor markets and, therefore, personal bankruptcies, are not 
limited to the NBER recession period.  It is, instead, more useful to obtain dates during 
which labor markets are in recession.   
We also need recession dates that are better aligned geographically with the 
decision to file bankruptcy, which depends on local conditions.  To match our state-level 
bankruptcy data, we need state-level recession dates.  To obtain these dates, we follow 
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005), who show that the depth, timing, and duration of state 
labor-market recessions are quite different from national labor-market recessions and 
NBER recessions.  They apply the Markov-switching model of Hamilton (1989) to the 
state-level coincident index of Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005), which combines 
payroll employment, wages and salaries, the unemployment rate, and hours worked into a 
single index.   
Although our bankruptcy data are available back to 1980 and through mid-2009, 
we restrict our analysis to 1988.Q1-2004.Q4.  First, we need to excise the structural break 
associated with the 2005 changes in bankruptcy laws.  Although this means that we are 
unable to consider the 2008-2009 recession, we cannot perform a complete analysis 
anyway because we need a sufficiently long post-recession period.  Second, as shown by 
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2008), the so-called Great Moderation, which meant a 
structural break in a number of aggregate variables around 1984, occurred at different 
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times across states, some as late as the latter part of the 1980s.  Because the coincident 
index begins in 1979, we do not have a long enough time series to account for the 
structural break and cannot, therefore, include the recessions from the 1980s.   
Despite the restrictions at both ends of our data set, our state-level analysis can be 
expected to yield something like 100 labor-market recessions.  Because of this, we 
overcome a major obstacle to explaining bankruptcy rates during recessions because 
national-level data provide only two observations of recession during the period.  We 
cannot, however, include all states in our analysis:  The recession experiences of Alaska 
and Hawaii are extremely idiosyncratic and do not match up with official national 
recessions (Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 2005).  We therefore exclude these states because 
we need states’ recessions to have somewhat similar timing.   
 We apply the Markov-switching model to the remaining states and find that we 
also need to exclude Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming because they were in 
recession prior to 1988, so we don’t know when their recessions began.  For the 
remaining 45 states the occurrence of state recessions between 1988.Q2 and 2004.Q4 is 
shown in Figure 2.
4
  What is clear from these results is that there is great variation across 
states in the timing and duration of recessions.  It is this variation that we exploit in a 
panel-data framework to assess the behavior of the personal-bankruptcy rate during 
recessionary and recovery periods.  In addition to providing more observations, our use 
                                                 
4
 Note that we apply the convention that a recession probability greater than 0.6 indicates a recession.  
Also, because the estimation is in growth rates, we do not have an observation for 1988.Q1. 
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of state-level data has the advantage of providing a better geographic match of weak 
economic conditions to the resulting bankruptcies.      
 As noted above, a benefit of our approach is that, because it considers labor-
market recessions, it ameliorates the anomaly of a falling bankruptcy rate during a 
recession.  This can be illustrated by comparing the national bankruptcy rate with the 
recession dates obtained from applying the Markov-switching model to the national 
coincident index.  Figures 3 and 4 compare these labor-market-recession dates to the 
national bankruptcy rate during the two recession periods.  Note that the national labor-
market recessions began earlier and ended later than NBER recessions and that for each 
labor-market recession the bankruptcy rate was higher at its end than it was at its start.  
There was, nevertheless, significant movement in the bankruptcy rate during each labor-
market recession, and we still have not removed the effect of the ongoing trend.  Still, 
particularly for the 2001 recession, the labor-market-recession dates match up much 
better with the bankruptcy rate than do the NBER dates, reinforcing the notion that labor-
market recessions are more useful for explaining the effects of recessions on bankruptcy 
rates than are NBER recession periods.    
4. State Bankruptcy Rates 
 As at the national level, state-level bankruptcy rates have tended to rise over the 
last 30 years and within our sample period (1988-2004).  There was, however, a great 
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deal of cross-state variation in both levels and trends.
5
  For the states in our sample, the 
mean quarterly bankruptcy rate over the sample period (measured henceforth as per 
100,000 persons) ranged from Vermont’s average of 48.2 to Tennessee’s average of 
208.1, with a cross-state average of 99.6.  The levels and trends in state bankruptcy rates 
are illustrated by Figure 5.  In 1988, Northeastern states had the lowest bankruptcy rates 
whereas the highest bankruptcy rates were in the South and West.  By 2004 the pattern 
had changed somewhat as only four of the ten states with the lowest bankruptcy rates 
were in the Northeast and the other six were in the Far West or Upper Midwest.   
 As outlined below, our estimation allows for cross-state differences in levels and 
trends by including state fixed effects, state-specific quadratic time trends, and state-
specific autoregressive errors.  To capture the general movement in bankruptcy rates 
during and after recessions, we will assume commonality in the states’ experiences 
during those periods.  As we describe below, however, we do allow for states to differ in 
the lengths and strengths of their recessions.   
 To characterize the behavior of bankruptcies during and after recessions, we 
estimate the relationship between state bankruptcy rates and sets of dummy variables that 
indicate where the states are in their idiosyncratic business cycles.  We take account not 
only of whether or not the state is in a recession or recovery, but also where it is within 
the recession or recovery.  We also control for the cross-state differences in trends and 
levels summarized in Figure 5.   
                                                 
5
 Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) provide explanations for the cross-state differences.  See also Miller (2009), 
who looks at how state laws affect who files for bankruptcy. 
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A recessionary quarter is a period during which negative income shocks for 
individuals and households are dominant, and, conversely, an expansionary quarter is one 
during which positive income shocks are dominant.  In an expansionary quarter, 
households become more confident in the future, are willing to take on a greater debt 
burden, and finance their increasing obligations based on their current income.  As 
economic conditions worsen and a recession hits, on net, households lose income—
through lower wages or job loss—and more find themselves overleveraged and filing for 
bankruptcy.  Thus, for a given period of recession, a higher-than-average number of 
households are hit by a negative income shock, which means bankruptcy for some of 
them, perhaps with a lag.   
 The pressure on personal finances accumulates as the recession continues, 
suggesting a dynamic component to the link between the occurrence of negative income 
shocks and the bankruptcy rate.  For one thing, perhaps some households can weather a 
negative income shock for a short while, but, as a recession drags on, more of them are 
faced with bankruptcy.  In addition, the longer a recession lasts, the more likely it is that a 
household is hit by subsequent negative income shocks.  The household’s personal 
finances might have been able to handle the first shock, but not a second or third.  As a 
result, the rate of bankruptcy should rise as a recession persists. 
 There might also be a dynamic component to the bankruptcy rate even after the 
recession ends.  First, if we think of a recovery period as one in which the occurrence of 
positive individual income shocks predominate, we would expect the bankruptcy rate to 
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fall as soon as the recession ends.  There could be, however, a bankruptcy hangover that 
lingers into the recovery period because people close to insolvency might have to wait for 
their positive shock to occur.  Further, the length of time that this hangover continues 
might be related to the length of the preceding recession because longer recessions result 
in more at-risk households at the time the recovery begins.  The speed at which the 
bankruptcy rate returns to its trend level should depend, therefore, on two opposing 
forces: the strength of the recovery (i.e., the rate at which positive income shocks occur) 
and the length of the preceding recession.  
 Our use of dummy variables means that we need not assume any particular 
functional form for the bankruptcy rate to follow during or after a recession.  Specifically, 
the dummy variable Rcit equals one if at time t state i is in its c
th
 quarter of recession.  
Similarly, the dummy variable Vkit equals one if at time t state i is in its k
th
 quarter of 
recovery.  Finally, we include the interaction term VkitLit, for which Lit is the length of the 
recession that preceded the recovery.  The trend bankruptcy rate for state i at time t, 
denoted as Bit, is, therefore, 
  
  

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Equation (1) includes the state-specific time-dependent intercept, a
i
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where α0 is common across states, αi is the state-specific fixed effect, and ωi and πi are 
the coefficients on the state-specific quadratic time trend.  Note that a
i
(t) also includes 
dummies to control for the quarter within a year.   
 We set C = 19 and K = 12, the number of recession and recovery dummies, 
respectively.  The value of C is dictated by the maximum recession length in our data, 
which is 19 quarters.  The value of K, on the other hand, is somewhat arbitrary but is not 
crucial as long as it is high enough to allow for the bankruptcy rate to return to near its 
non-recession/non-recovery level, while still leaving enough observations of normal 
quarters to make the estimation possible.    
5. Baseline Results 
 The results for our most general specification, Model I, are provided in Table 1, 
which also provides the results for three restricted versions of Model I.  Note that in all 
four models, the error term it  allows for state-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and 
heteroskedastic errors with cross-state correlation.  All of our estimation uses Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares and a balanced panel of 67 quarterly observations for each of 
the 45 states (3,105 observations). 
 All estimated coefficients measure the difference between the actual and trend 
bankruptcy rates, where the trend bankruptcy rate is what occurs during a quarter that is 
neither a recessionary quarter nor a recovery quarter (the 12 quarters after the end of a 
recession).  In (1) the trend bankruptcy rate for state i at time t is captured by the time-
dependent intercept a
i
(t).  As shown in the first column of results in Table 1, the 
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bankruptcy rate is statistically greater than trend for each of the first 18 quarters of 
recession, although, because we have very few observations of recessions lasting beyond 
13 quarters, results for recession quarters beyond the 13
th
 should be interpreted with some 
caution.  Note also that the recovery quarters tend to be statistically different from trend, 
starting above trend in the first quarters of recovery and ending below trend by the tenth 
quarter of recovery.  Recall that we also interacted the recovery dummies with the length 
of the preceding recession.  Our results show that there is a tendency for the recovery 
bankruptcy rate to be decreasing in the length of the recession.   
 These results, along with 95 percent confidence intervals, are illustrated by Figure 
6.  As shown by the top panel, after the first year of recession the bankruptcy rate tends to 
be about 6.4 points above trend, rising to 12.4 points above trend by the end of the third 
year of recession.  As illustrated by the middle panel, for a given length of the preceding 
recession, the bankruptcy rate continues to rise after a recession ends and remains above 
its trend rate for several quarters before falling steadily as the recovery proceeds.  The 
length of the preceding recession matters in determining the path by which the 
bankruptcy rate returns to trend during a recovery, but not for every quarter of recovery.   
 The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows that the bankruptcy rate is not strongly 
related to the length of the preceding recession for the first year of recovery, but it is 
negatively related to the length of the recession for the fifth through tenth quarters of 
recovery.  Thus, conditional on the length of the preceding recession, the bankruptcy rate 
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after a year of recovery can still be below its trend rate, and the extent to which it is 
below trend is increasing in the length of the preceding recession.   
 For example, the bankruptcy rate for the seventh quarter of recovery is about 1.4 
points lower for each quarter that the preceding recession lasted.  Combining this with the 
estimate that, for a given recession length, the bankruptcy rate in the seventh quarter of 
recovery is about 4.2 points above trend, the total effect is obtained:  The bankruptcy rate 
in the seventh quarter of recovery following a recession that lasted 10 quarters should be 
6.2 points below trend.    
 This ―bounce-back effect‖ might be a reflection of that found by Kim, Morley, 
and Piger (2005) for real GDP whereby growth following a recession tends to be higher 
than during normal expansionary periods and is related positively to the severity of the 
preceding recession.  On the other hand, the bounce-back might be due to a depletion in 
the stock of at-risk households.  Even during normal periods there is some number of 
households at risk of bankruptcy, and a certain percentage of them file for bankruptcy 
during any quarter.  The longer a recession lasts, the fewer at-risk households there are 
when the recovery begins. 
 Figure 7 combines the results from the bottom two panels of Figure 6 and 
illustrates the estimated path of the bankruptcy rate during recovery periods conditional 
on recession lengths of from three to 13 quarters.  Bankruptcy rates during the first 
quarter of recovery are somewhat higher the longer the recession had lasted, but a lengthy 
recession means that rates return to trend more quickly.  Further, the longer the recession 
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was, the bigger the bounce-back in the bankruptcy rate.  So, although the bankruptcy rate 
rises throughout the length of a recession, a long recession is followed by a recovery 
period with bankruptcy rates that are substantially below trend for several quarters 
beyond the first six quarters of recovery. 
 Figure 8 puts all of our results together to illustrate the entire personal-bankruptcy 
cycle, conditional on recession lengths of from three to 13 quarters.  Longer recessions 
mean rising bankruptcy rates throughout the recession, followed by bankruptcy rates that 
remain above trend during the first year of recovery.  But longer recessions also mean 
that bankruptcy rates return to trend earlier and a have a larger bounce-back that can last 
into the fourth year of recovery.  For example, for a recession that lasts one year, the 
bankruptcy rate peaks at about 6.8 points above trend during the second quarter of 
recovery, and then declines throughout the recovery before becoming well below trend 
for several quarters.  For a recession that lasts three years, the bankruptcy rate peaks in 
the final quarter of the recession at about 12.4 points above trend, and returns to trend 
more than one year later.  This is followed by a bounce-back effect whereby about one 
year later the bankruptcy rate is almost 14 points below trend. 
6. Aggregate Implications 
 In the previous section we outlined our finding that bankruptcies respond strongly 
to labor-market conditions, thereby indicating a statistically and economically significant 
occurrence of nonstrategic bankruptcy.  Even during recessions, however, when 
nonstrategic considerations should be most important, ongoing trends explain a larger 
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portion of changes in bankruptcy rates.  Specifically, state bankruptcy rates increased by 
an average of 31.6 points during the state recessions that occurred in conjunction with the 
national recessions of 1990-91 and 2001.
6
  Combining our results with the data the 
recessions accounted for an average increase of 12.6 points, thereby accounting for about 
two-fifths of the increase in the bankruptcy rate that had occurred.  
 So how much did the occurrence of state personal-bankruptcy cycles affect the 
overall national bankruptcy picture?  Recall that states entered recessions at different 
times and that during some periods there are states in recession, others in recovery, and 
the rest at their trend bankruptcy rates.  Because state recessions are staggered in this 
way, so are their personal-bankruptcy cycles, which would tend to smooth their affect on 
the aggregate picture.  To see this, look at Figure 9, which shows the cross-state average 
in the recession- and recovery-induced changes in bankruptcy rates.  Note that for some 
periods after the end of the two NBER recessions, the bankruptcy rates for some states 
are above trend because the state is still in recession, while for other states it is because 
they are in the early quarters of recovery.  Eventually, as some states continue their 
recoveries and other states that had experienced long recessions have just begun their 
recoveries, the bounce-back effect becomes dominant. 
 Figure 10 puts our results in the context of the actual average bankruptcy rate over 
the sample period.  The solid line is the actual average whereas the dashed line is what 
the average would have been with the personal-bankruptcy cycle removed.  The first 
                                                 
6
 Note that we only consider up to the 13
th
 quarter of recession and the longest continuous recession for a 
state during the period surrounding the national recession. 
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thing to notice from the figure is that the dominant movements in the average bankruptcy 
rate have nothing to do with the recessions that occurred during the period.  Still, it is 
clear from the figure that the average bankruptcy rate was affected substantially before, 
during, and after NBER recessions.  Usually the underlying state personal-bankruptcy 
cycles raised the average bankruptcy rate above trend.  But during 1993 and 1994, when 
states were well into their recoveries, the average bankruptcy rate was below trend 
because of the preponderance of state-level bounce-back effects reversed this. 
7. Restricted Specifications 
 We estimated three alternative specifications of (1), each of which is a restricted 
version of the baseline, Model I.  The first two alternatives, Models II and III, impose 
commonality restrictions on the state time trends  iii     and   and state fixed 
effects  ii   0 , respectively.  The third alternative, Model IV, assumes that the 
bankruptcy rate during recovery is unrelated to the length of the preceding recession
 kk   0 .  The results for Models II-IV are provided in Table 1 and are compared with 
Model I and each other in Figure 11.
7
   
 For the most part, Model II provides results for all three categories of coefficients 
that are very similar to those from the baseline estimation.  This is somewhat surprising 
given the large differences in state-level bankruptcy trends.  Nevertheless, this suggests 
that differences in state trends appear to be unrelated to the movement of state bankruptcy 
                                                 
7
 Note that also estimated the baseline model without allowing for state-specific autocorrelation and state-
specific heteroskedasticity that is correlated across states.  The effects of not allowing for these error 
structures are similar in magnitude to those discussed above for restrictions on the specification.  These 
results are suppressed for space considerations. 
17 
 
rates over the business cycle, so a common trend would not have injected significant bias 
into our estimation of the personal-bankruptcy cycle.  Model III, on the other hand, 
provides substantially different quantitative results from the baseline model, indicating 
that the state fixed effects are related to each of the three components of the personal-
bankruptcy cycle.  Specifically, Model III yields smaller increases in bankruptcy rates 
during recessions, higher bankruptcy rates during recoveries, and a stronger link between 
recession length and the bounce-back effect. 
 If we had estimated Model IV, we would have missed much of the bounce-back 
effect.  Specifically, the middle panel of Figure 11 shows that this model suggests a faster 
return to trend during recoveries and the entire bounce-back effect is captured by these 
coefficients.  Because Model IV does not allow for the differences in the length of the 
recession to affect what happens during the recovery, the estimated bounce-back that it 
provides is something like the average across the span of recession lengths in our sample.  
It therefore misses the large differences in bounce-back across recessions of different 
lengths. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
 By using recessionary periods to capture the persistence of weak labor markets, 
we have estimated a personal-bankruptcy cycle that is related to the business cycle.  
Bankruptcy rates are significantly higher than trend during recessions and rise as 
recessions persist.  Even after recessions end, there is a hangover whereby bankruptcy 
rates begin to fall but remain above trend for several more quarters.  The longer the 
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recession, the faster is the return to trend.  Recovery periods see a strong bounce-back 
effect whereby bankruptcy rates are significantly below trend for several quarters before 
returning to trend.  The more severe the preceding recession, the deeper is this bounce-
back.  
  Although there are numerous studies that have explored the relationship between 
local labor-market conditions and personal-bankruptcy decisions, there is little consensus 
regarding the strength of this relationship.  Our results suggest that nonstrategic 
considerations can matter a great deal in personal-bankruptcy decisions, at least when 
weak labor markets are endemic and persistent.  This is very far from saying that strategic 
considerations are not important, however.  In fact, ongoing trends, which capture 
everything that happens over time except for recessions, explain a larger share of the 
changes in bankruptcy rates during recessions than does our model of the personal-
bankruptcy cycle.   
19 
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Table 1. Regression Results with Alternative Specifications 
  Model I Model II 
se 
Model III 
se 
Model IV 
Recession 
Quarter 
1 1.89 (0.28) * 2.19 (0.28) * 1.59 (0.29) * 1.83 (0.28) * 
2 2.47 (0.38) * 2.74 (0.41) * 2.01 (0.41) * 2.55 (0.38) * 
3 4.87 (0.46) * 5.29 (0.49) * 3.89 (0.49) * 4.87 (0.45) * 
4 6.43 (0.50) * 7.06 (0.55) * 5.17 (0.55) * 6.62 (0.50) * 
5 5.68 (0.55) * 6.55 (0.59) * 4.31 (0.59) * 5.96 (0.54) * 
6 6.15 (0.60) * 7.25 (0.65) * 4.77 (0.65) * 6.42 (0.59) * 
7 7.40 (0.65) * 8.68 (0.71) * 5.99 (0.70) * 7.69 (0.62) * 
8 8.34 (0.69) * 9.75 (0.74) * 6.66 (0.73) * 8.52 (0.63) * 
9 10.46 (0.74) * 12.01 (0.80) * 8.62 (0.79) * 10.57 (0.66) * 
10 9.31 (0.77) * 10.93 (0.84) * 7.39 (0.83) * 9.25 (0.65) * 
11 10.53 (0.86) * 12.02 (0.93) * 8.44 (0.93) * 10.70 (0.70) * 
12 12.35 (0.90) * 13.93 (0.97) * 10.03 (0.96) * 12.10 (0.71) * 
13 11.68 (1.00) * 13.29 (1.08) * 9.65 (1.03) * 11.30 (0.74) * 
14 9.99 (1.25) * 11.63 (1.34) * 8.14 (1.28) * 9.36 (1.01) * 
15 8.03 (1.41) * 9.34 (1.49) * 5.60 (1.42) * 7.13 (1.13) * 
16 12.28 (1.47) * 14.16 (1.55) * 9.60 (1.50) * 11.46 (1.20) * 
17 5.53 (1.51) * 7.65 (1.57) * 3.31 (1.55) * 5.72 (1.32) * 
18 3.42 (1.55) * 4.81 (0.72) * 5.22 (0.73) * 6.57 (0.50) * 
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-2.55 (1.69)  7.38 (0.82) * 8.51 (0.82) * 5.03 (0.51) * 
Recovery 
Quarter 
1 5.00 (0.68) * 4.81 (0.72) * 5.22 (0.73) * 6.57 (0.50) * 
2 8.42 (0.76) * 7.38 (0.82) * 8.51 (0.82) * 5.03 (0.51) * 
3 7.41 (0.85) * 6.13 (0.93) * 7.80 (0.91) * 5.85 (0.54) * 
4 3.29 (0.95) * 1.98 (1.03)  4.27 (1.03) * 3.13 (0.57) * 
5 6.63 (1.00) * 4.37 (1.08) * 8.44 (1.09) * -0.21 (0.59)   
6 4.71 (1.01) * 2.47 (1.08) * 6.98 (1.13) * -2.54 (0.62) * 
7 4.24 (1.16) * 2.03 (1.26)  6.70 (1.28) * -5.36 (0.68) * 
8 -2.88 (1.21) * -4.05 (1.33) * -0.32 (1.36)  -6.98 (0.71) * 
9 -1.43 (1.22)  -2.46 (1.34)  1.59 (1.36)  -5.79 (0.71) * 
10 -2.24 (1.20)  -3.33 (1.30) * 0.22 (1.32)  -6.43 (0.67) * 
11 -3.41 (1.12) * -3.98 (1.20) * -1.84 (1.22)  -5.38 (0.60) * 
12 -5.26 (0.95) * -5.06 (0.99) * -4.10 (0.98) * -3.88 (0.45) * 
Recession-
Length 
Interaction 
1 0.20 (0.09) * 0.35 (0.10) * 0.02 (0.09)     
2 -0.42 (0.10) * -0.17 (0.11)  -0.57 (0.10) *    
3 -0.22 (0.11) * 0.07 (0.11)  -0.42 (0.11) *    
4 -0.09 (0.12)  0.22 (0.12)  -0.29 (0.13) *    
5 -0.91 (0.13) * -0.48 (0.13) * -1.16 (0.14) *    
6 -1.03 (0.14) * -0.55 (0.14) * -1.31 (0.15) *    
7 -1.40 (0.16) * -0.88 (0.16) * -1.58 (0.18) *    
8 -0.61 (0.17) * -0.23 (0.17)  -0.77 (0.19) *    
9 -0.63 (0.17) * -0.27 (0.17)  -0.83 (0.19) *    
10 -0.59 (0.16) * -0.27 (0.17)  -0.77 (0.18) *    
11 -0.26 (0.15)  -0.03 (0.15)  -0.32 (0.17)     
12 0.19 (0.12)  0.28 (0.12) * 0.10 (0.13)     
Quarter 
Dummies 
Q2 5.14 (0.40) * 5.14 (0.37) * 5.19 (0.38) * 5.22 (0.38) * 
Q3 -0.30 (0.45)  -0.55 (0.42)  -0.21 (0.43)  -0.28 (0.42)   
Q4 -2.50 (0.40) * -2.59 (0.37) * -2.43 (0.38) * -2.54 (0.38) * 
Quadratic Trend State-specific Common State-specific State-specific 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes 
The dependent variable is the state personal-bankruptcy rate and data are quarterly for 1988.2-2004.4.  The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors and an ―*‖ indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  All estimates are obtained using 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares. 
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Figure 1 
Shaded areas indicate NBER Recessions 
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Figure 2 
 State Labor-Market Recession Dates, 1988-1994 and 1998-2004 
(Shaded Area Indicates a National Labor-Market Recession) 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Alabama                     █ █ █                                                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Arkansas                                                                           █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
California                     █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █         
Colorado                                                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Connecticutt         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                             █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Delaware               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                       █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Florida                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Georgia                   █ █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Idaho                                                                             █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Illinois                     █ █ █ █ █ █                                             █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █         
Indiana                     █ █                                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █     █ █ █             
Iowa                                                                         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Kansas                   █ █ █                                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Kentucky                     █ █ █                                                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Louisiana     █ █             █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █   █ █ █   
Maine         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █   █                             █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ 
Maryland                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                                               
Massachussetts         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Michigan         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ 
Minnesota                 █ █ █ █ █                                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █         
Mississippi                   █ █ █ █                                           █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █     █ █ █ 
Missouri                   █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Montana     █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Nebraska                     █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                       █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ 
Nevada                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                       █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █               
New Hampshire         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                     █ █ █ █ █ █                   
New Jersey         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                             █ █ █ █ █ █ █                   
New York                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █                       
North Carolina                   █ █ █ █                                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
North Dakota                                                         █ █             █ █ █   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █               
Ohio         █ █ █     █ █ █ █                                                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Oklahoma                                                                                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Oregon                   █ █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Pennsylvania                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                             █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Rhode Island         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                                                 
South Carolina                   █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
South Dakota                                                                         █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ 
Tennessee                   █ █ █ █                                                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Texas                       █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █         
Utah                                                                           █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
Vermont           █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                                         █ █ █ █ █ █                 
Virginia                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                               █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Washington                     █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █                                     █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
West Virginia                   █ █ █ █ █ █                                                   █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █             
Wisconsin                     █ █ █                                                 █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █           
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Figure 4 
Figure 3 
NBER Recession 
NBER Recession 
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Bankruptcy Rates, 1988.Q2
Quarterly per 100,000
0.0 to 26.2
26.2 to 41.0
41.0 to 62.3
62.3 to 84.3
84.3 to 146.3
 
 
Figure 5 
State Bankruptcy Rates 
1988 and 2004 
Bankruptcy Rates, 2004.Q4
Quarterly per 100,000
0.0 to 82.8
82.8 to 105.2
105.2 to 134.9
134.9 to 154.4
154.4 to 232.8
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 Figure 6 
Model I Differences in Bankruptcy Rates Relative to Trend 
with Confidence Intervals 
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Figure 11 
Model Comparisons 
